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The Perfect Caper? Private Damages
and the Microsoft Case
Robert H. Lande & James Langenfeld*
As readers of crime novels know, there are many definitions of the per-
fect caper.' Under most, the perpetrator gets to keep its ill-gotten gains and
goes unpunished. Even if the perpetrator is arrested and brought to trial, he
or she still typically escapes punishment completely due to a variety of unu-
sual circumstances. This is essentially what Professors John E. Lopatka and
William H. Page are arguing about Microsoft's actions.2 They assert that
even though Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws, it will not be made to
pay for its anticompetitive conduct, at least not by private plaintiffs.
Their conclusions can be divided into four key parts. First, the case was
never primarily about money, about Microsoft charging too much or too lit-
tle. Rather, it was always about Microsoft detrimentally affecting innovation
and consumer choice. Some of these effects will manifest themselves in the
short run, but mainly these are long-term effects. Second, when it comes to
damages in private actions, the only harms that can potentially be quantified
are those harms from higher prices. Damages resulting from harms to inno-
vation-the innovation that never happened and the choices that were never
presented to consumers-are too difficult to quantify. 3 Third, even if one
could find some price effects from Microsoft's actions, they will be too hard
to disentangle from Microsoft's legitimate business practices.4 Finally, as a
* Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore, and Senior Fellow, American Anti-
trust Institute; and Director, Law & Economics Consulting Group, LLC, and Senior Fellow,
American Antitrust Institute, respectively. Neither author has been directly involved in the
Microsoft case, except insofar as Professor Lande has been involved with the American Anti-
trust Institute's participation in the Microsoft case's Tunney Act proceeding. This article's analy-
sis and opinions are based upon our review of some, but not all, of the extensive publicly
available evidence in the record. We wish to thank Bert Foer for extremely helpful comments
and Samuel Colings and Joseph King for exceptional assistance in preparing this article. The
opinions expressed are only those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of LECG
or the American Antitrust Institute.
1 We are not, of course, arguing that Microsoft has committed any crimes. It was merely
charged with, and found liable for, civil violations of the antitrust laws. Interestingly, the case's
trial judge, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, characterized Microsoft's "'crime' as hubris."
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en banc).
2 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in the Microsoft
Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 829 (2001).
3 Lopatka and Page do not explicitly say that there is no chance whatsoever of any pri-
vate plaintiff recovering any damages from Microsoft, but the tone of their symposium piece
certainly suggests this. See id.
4 Moreover, most states lack Illinois Brick repealer statutes. See generally Roland W.
Davis, Indirect Purchaser Litigation: ARC America's Chickens Come Home To Roost On The
Illinois Brick Wall, 65 ANTrrgusT L.J. 375, 391-93 (1997). In these states only direct purchasers
can sue for damages.
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result of the above, Microsoft will not have to pay any significant amount of
damages in private cases.
5
Professors Lopatka and Page have written an excellent symposium
piece, and there is substantial merit to their arguments. However, we believe
that their conclusions are overstated. We differ from them in degree, and
believe that there could be antitrust claims against Microsoft that private
plaintiffs may be able to prove to a reasonable certainty.6 Their arguments
are essentially the same as those made by defendants (correctly or not) in
most monopolization cases. 7 Proving damages can be particularly difficult in
cases where a new competitor is being excluded from a market. That situa-
tion is analogous to some of the claims in Microsoft. Such cases always re-
quire a projection of what would have happened to the excluded entrants'
sales "but-for" the anticompetitive acts.8 However, the difficulty in making
such projections does not necessarily mean that the required proof of dam-
ages is impossible. Economists use various methods for estimating antitrust
damages in these types of cases all of the time with varying degrees of suc-
cess.9 These methods include "before and after," "yardstick," and "market
share," as well as various statistical techniques such as econometric analysis. 10
In this piece, we provide a brief overview of a variety of possible claims
in the Microsoft case, and discuss the challenges to proving damages for each
type. We will show that, from a private plaintiff's perspective, Microsoft's
capers may not necessarily have been perfect.
In its June 28, 2001, decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") held that Microsoft engaged in twelve
illegal courses of conduct, any one of which would alone constitute a viola-
tion of section 2 of the Sherman Act." The court found many of Microsoft's
actions to be part of a scheme to illegally maintain a monopoly in the market
for personal computer ("PC") operating systems ("OS").12 The D.C. Circuit
5 Lopatka & Page, supra note 2.
6 In the Microsoft case there may be an inverse correlation between the seriousness of the
effects of Microsoft's illegal behavior on competition, and the ease or probability of proving any
damages.
7 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analy-
sis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEo. MAsoN L. REv. 617, 620-22 (1999) (an analysis of
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951)); see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 728-732 (1977). Defendants like Microsoft typically posture that allowing private
plaintiffs to sue in addition to the federal government would create a problem of multiple liabil-
ity for defendants and extremely complex damages proceedings. The courts allegedly would not
be in a position to allocate the damages among all of the parties involved due to the overlapping,
complex, and numerous factors.
8 Salop & Romaine, supra note 7.
9 See ABA ANTnmRusr SECTION, 1998 ANNUAL REvIEw OF ANTrrRusT LAW DEVELOP-
mENrs 282-89 (1999); ABA ANrrnusr SECTION, ANTrrRusr DEVELOPMmN's 787-94 (4th ed.
1997).
10 ABA ANTrrmusT SECTION, 1998 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ANTTRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
282-89 (1999); see also ABA ANITRusT SECION, PROVING ANTrnIusT DAMAGES: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC IssUEs ch. 5 (1996).
11 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en banc).
12 Ld. at 50-51. The Department of Justice and some of the plaintiff-states have reached a
settlement with Microsoft. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Justice
and Microsoft Corporation Reach Effective Settlement on Antitrust Lawsuit, Settlement Pro-
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dismissed the lower court ruling that Microsoft had attempted to monopolize
"the putative browser market. ' 13 It remanded the tying allegation to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings, 14 vacated the district court's Final Judg-
ment on remedies, and remanded the case to a different trial judge.15 The
United States Department of Justice, however, has indicated it would not
pursue the tying allegations on remand.1
6
For simplicity, we will group possible plaintiff damages allegations into
three categories: (1) harms directly concerning the OS market; (2) harms
directly concerning the browser market; and (3) harms resulting from the
specific conduct that constituted the illegal maintenance of Microsoft's OS
monopoly.
L Private Damages Directly Concerning the OS Market
The D.C. Circuit condemned a series of Microsoft's actions for illegally
maintaining its OS monopoly. 17 Microsoft was found to have illegally sup-
pressed nascent competition that could have developed into the threat of a
competing OS. 18 In many respects, each of these actions amounted to exclu-
sive dealing arrangements. For example, Microsoft illegally prevented origi-
nal equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") from "(1) removing any [Microsoft]
desktop icons, folders, or 'Start' menu entries; (2) altering the initial boot
sequence [by, for example, adding icons for rival products]; and (3) otherwise
altering the appearance of the Windows desktop." 19 Additionally, in certain
circumstances users were not permitted to select a default browser other than
vides Enforcement Measures to Stop Microsoft's Unlawful Conduct, Prevents Its Recurrence
and Restores Competition (Nov. 2, 2001) (on file with author). The following states have joined
the proposed settlement agreement: New York, Ohio, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. United States v. Microsoft, No. Civ-98-1232 (D.D.C.
filed Nov. 6, 2001) (stipulation). The judge is now reviewing the settlement pursuant to the
Tunney Act to determine whether the settlement is in the public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)
(1994). However, some of the plaintiff-states concluded that the settlement was not in the public
interest because it would not achieve the goals of an antitrust remedy procedure. The following
states are maintaining a civil action: California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Utah, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. United States v. Microsoft,
No. Civ-98-1233 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 7, 2001) (plaintiff litigating states' remedial proposals). They
continue to pursue a remedy case against Microsoft. Id.
13 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80.
14 Id. at 94.
15 The D.C. Circuit did this for three reasons: "First, the District Court failed to hold an
evidentiary hearing despite the presence of remedies-specific factual disputes. Second, the court
did not provide adequate reasons for its decreed remedies. Finally, we have drastically altered
the scope of Microsoft's liability." Id. at 107. Although the district court's remedy in the gov-
ernment's case involve divestiture and other interim limitations on Microsoft's actions, and not
monetary damages, the D.C. Circuit's first two reasons provide an indication of the complexities
involved in linking Microsoft's actions to specific damages to customers and competitors.
16 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Informs Microsoft of
Plans for Further Proceedings in the District Court, Action Seeks Prompt, Effective, and Certain
Relief for Consumers (Sept. 6, 2001) (on file with author).
17 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50-51.
18 Id. at 60-61.
19 Id. at 61. These restrictions were held to be illegal. Id. at 64.
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Internet Explorer ("IE"). 20 PC users were on occasion not permitted to re-
move IE, because Microsoft removed IE from the Windows "Add/Remove
Programs" control panel.21 Further, Microsoft entered into fourteen exclu-
sive dealing arrangements with Internet access providers,22 and similar deals
with Internet content providers, independent software venders, and Apple
Computer, Inc.23 Microsoft also engaged in other illegal exclusive dealing
arrangements.24 The D.C. Circuit found these practices had the effect of ille-
gally foreclosing rival browsers from the market25 and illegally maintaining
their monopoly power in the OS market.
2 6
This raises the question.of whether any potential "nascent"27 producer
of a potentially competing operating system could show in a subsequent pri-
vate damages actions that, if not for Microsoft's illegal actions, it might well
have been able to develop and market a competing operating system. This
task would be difficult. The would-be producer may have to prove that it was
likely that a new OS would have come into being, succeeded in capturing
significant market share, and made a profit.
We are unaware of evidence that any company was close to succeeding
at producing a new 0S 28 There was certainly considerable speculation in the
industry that Sun, Oracle, and Netscape together could have one day devel-
oped such a competing OS.29 The public record does not contain informa-
tion, however, showing how far their efforts to create a new OS advanced.
Furthermore, we are unaware of evidence in the Microsoft record that would
permit plaintiffs to demonstrate that, if not for Microsoft's actions, these
firms might have been able to enter the OS market profitably.
Alternative operating systems, such as Linux and IBM's OS/2 were sell-
ing approximately five percent of PC operating systems at the time the
Microsoft case was filed.30 Moreover, their market shares have declined in
recent years.31 Could any of these sellers of a competing OS prove that
20 Id. at 64-67.
21 Id. at 65. This was also judged illegal. Id. at 67.
22 Id. at 67-69, 70-71.
23 Id. at 71-74.
24 Id. at 74-78.
25 Id. at 71.
26 Id. "[B]y keeping rival browsers from gaining widespread distribution ... the deals
have a substantial effect in preserving Microsoft's monopoly." Id. at 72.
27 Id. at 54.
28 United States v. Microsoft Corp. 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 110 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact
407).
It is not clear whether, absent Microsoft's interference, Sun's Java efforts would by
now have facilitated porting between Wimdows and other platforms enough to
weaken the applications barrier to entry. What is clear, however, is that Microsoft
has succeeded in greatly impeding Java's progress to that end with a series of ac-
tions whose sole purpose and effect were to do precisely that.
Id.
29 Id. at 28, 110.
30 Microsoft's share of the relevant OS market exceeded ninety-five percent. Id. at 19, 22-
23; see also Marcus Maher, Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative Intellectual
Property Incentive Paradigm, 10 FoRDnm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 619, 684 n.305
(2000).
31 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 19, 23.
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Microsoft's exclusionary conduct hurt their sales and profits significantly?
Such a claim might well lend itself to proof.
If IBM or any maker of Linux were to be a plaintiff, they would still
have to show how much their market share would have grown "but-for"
Microsoft's illegal actions and how that would have affected their profit. It
might be possible to estimate a competitor's growth rate from the experience
or "benchmarks" of other new entrants in software gaining market share at
the expense of a dominate incumbent, such as Word's displacement of
WordPerfect. 3
2
In addition, economists may be able to use standard statistical tech-
niques to quantify the impact of various Microsoft actions on Linux and OS/2
sales and market shares. 33 Disaggregation of damages into each separate ac-
tion could present challenges because several of the actions at issue took
place at the same time. However, the combined effect of various anticompe-
titive actions that served to maintain the OS monopoly illegally would pre-
sumably, and most appropriately, be combined to measure the full effect of
illegal monopolization. The more difficult aspect would be separating the
procompetitive aspects of new product introductions that took place concur-
rently with the Microsoft actions at issue.
Microsoft may have also lowered its OS price out of a fear that purchas-
ers might otherwise switch to these alternative OSs, even if the ones under
development would not actually have succeeded in successfully and profita-
bly entering the market.34 Potential entrants can affect the price charged by
firms in a market.35 Professor Robert E. Hall has even used potential entry
by PC makers to estimate "but-for" prices absent Microsoft's actions and
absent a new entrant.36 In a private suit, plaintiffs presumably would have to
show that as there increasingly "could," not "would," have been a rival OS,
or that if a revitalized Linux or OS/2 might have been a more serious compet-
itor, Microsoft may have lowered the price of its OS. Purchasers of OSs, such
32 See Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANIRusT LJ. 693,
721 n.114 (2000).
33 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, PROVING ANTnRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
IssuEs ch. 5 (1996).
34 Memorandum from Bill Gates, Microsoft, The Internet Tidal Wave (May 26, 1995),
Gov't Ex. 20, Microsoft ("[Netscape is] pursuing a multi-platform strategy where they move the
key API into the chent to commoditize the underlying operating system."). Microsoft executive
Brad Chase wrote: "Netscape's primary strategy has not changed: they still want to obsolete
Windows. Netscape and Sun endeavor to commoditize the OS and drive developers to adopt
their technologies and APIs." Memorandum from Brad Chase, Microsoft, Preserving the
desktop paradise (April 4, 1997), Gov't Ex. 510, Microsoft. This and many of the other citations
to the Microsoft case record were taken from Stephen D. Houck, Injury to Competition/Con-
sumers in High Tech Cases, Address Before the New York Bar Conference on Consumer Injury
in Antitrust Litigation: Necessary or Not? (Nov. 30, 2000).
35 See generally Malcolm B. Coate & James Langenfeld, Entry Under the Merger Guide-
lines 1982-1992, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1993); see also Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (Find-
ings of Fact 55) ("OEMs believe that the likelihood of a viable alternative to Windows
emerging any time in the next few years is too low to constrain Microsoft from raising prices.").
36 Robert E. Hall, Toward a Quantification of the Effects of Microsoft's Conduct, Address




as computer manufacturers or indirect purchasers in states where such claims
are allowed, might then be able to claim these damages.37
Proving these price reduction damages could be a formidable task.38
First, plaintiffs would have to establish a date by which entry would have
been likely. Absent business plans and supporting testimony from the poten-
tial entrants, picking and supporting a date would be difficult. Second, plain-
tiffs would have to establish benchmarks as to what had, in the past,
happened to the prices of other monopoly software under the threat of en-
try.39 This also would not be easy for plaintiffs to do, even if Professor Hall's
approach is accepted. The hint in Judge Jackson's opinion-that Microsoft
considered pricing at $49 but instead chose $894-would only be the starting
point in plaintiffs' difficult case. We do not believe, however, that the re-
quired proof necessarily would be impossible.
II. Private Damages Directly Concerning the Browser Market
A second broad category of potential damages actions concern
Microsoft's destruction of competition from Netscape and others in the
browser "market."'4 1 The D.C. Circuit dismissed the charge that Microsoft
illegally attempted to monopolize this market because it found that the plain-
tiffs failed to adequately define a browser, and they had not shown barriers
to entry into such a market.42 While the appellate court will not permit the
government to now attempt to define a browser market in any subsequent
37 Davis, supra note 4.
38 For some of the complexities involved in this type of case, see Edmund Sanders and
Joseph Menn, Big Error Found in Microsoft Hearing, L.A. TnvIss, Nov. 28, 2001, pt. 3, at 2. An
expert witness for Microsoft, Dr. Keith Leffler, testified that the class action plaintiffs "might be
entitled to recoup between $2 billion and $5 billion." Id. After a cross examination wherein a
significant error was pointed out to him, Leffler "returned to the court and announced he had
made a mistake and that the potential damages were more than twice that, or $5 billion to $13
billion." Id. For a very different analysis of the damages involved in this case, see the calcula-
tions of plaintiffs expert witness, Prof. Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, available at http://www-personal.
umich.edu/-jmm.
39 Perhaps plaintiffs could use other examples of entry into software markets where prices
have fallen as a benchmark. For example, if prices fell forty percent for WordPerfect when Word
was introduced, perhaps this reduction could apply to the price of Microsoft's operating systems
as well. Muris, supra note 32.
40 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,27 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact
63) ("A Microsoft study from November 1997 reveals that the company could have charged $49
for an upgrade to Windows 98-there is no reason to believe that the $49 piece would have been
unprofitable-but the study identifies $89 as the revenue-maximizing price. Microsoft thus
opted for the higher price."). Some of the necessary information that is in the Microsoft case
record might include Microsoft executive Kempin noting that Windows prices have increased
while prices of all other PC system components have decreased sharply. Memorandum from
Joachim Kempin to Bill Gates (Dec. 16, 1997), Gov't Ex. 365, Microsoft. Dr. Warren-Boulton
testified that Microsoft profits were an "astonishing" 38.5% of revenue, by far the highest of any
Fortune 500 company. Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Warren-Boulton (Nov. 23, 1998),
Microsoft. Warren-Boulton also estimated that Windows prices were "significantly" more than
5% above competitive levels. Id. (Nov. 19, 1998).
41 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 80-84.
42 ld. at 81-82.
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portion of this case,43 Netscape 44 or another maker45 or potential maker of
browsers could attempt to do so in a private suit. If they succeeded, they
might be able to show that Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct caused them
to be illegally damaged.
There is little doubt that Netscape has been severely reduced as a com-
petitive browser. It is withering, and its market share has been shrinking
rapidly, especially for new users.46 Microsoft's well-publicized attempt to
"choke off" Netscape's air supply47 succeeded, and its actions cost Netscape
many sales.48 In calculating damages, however, plaintiffs would have to dis-
aggregate Netscape's lost sales and profits caused by Microsoft's anticompeti-
tive actions from Netscape's losses caused by legitimate competition from IE.
For example, browsers cost nothing now, but before Microsoft's cam-
paign against Netscape, Netscape had been able to charge for its browser.
49
This price probably would have decreased if Microsoft had entered the mar-
ket but not used certain tactics that were or could be found to be anticompe-
titive. However, Netscape might be able to show that the price would not
have decreased as quickly, or to zero. Moreover, Netscape also profited from
advertising on its browser, and it might be able to prove that illegal tactics by
Microsoft cost Netscape advertising revenue. Again, plaintiffs may have to
43 Id. at 84.
44 Netscape has recently filed such a suit. Complaint, Netscape Comm. Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp. (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2002) (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233). The complaint is based upon the
finding of the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsoft "that Microsoft's illegal acts had 'in-
flicted considerable harm on Netscape's business."' Id. at 1. They allege that Microsoft since
1995 has used its monopoly power "to prevent the Netscape Web browser from serving as an
alternate platform." Id. 26. Microsoft has effectively reduced Netscape's market share elimi-
nating any risk of Netscape developing an alternative platform to Microsoft's operating system.
Id. 32. Microsoft has unreasonably restrained competition in the web browser market by ille-
gally tying Internet Explorer to Microsoft Windows. Id 37-38. "Microsoft has willfully and
wrongfully acquired, maintained and abused its monopoly power in Web browsers through an-
ticompetitive and exclusionary behavior." Id. 44. Microsoft has a dominant position in the
Web browser market by acting with specific intent to destroy competition in that market. Id.
49. Microsoft has intentionally interfered with Netscape fulfilling its real and prospective con-
tractual obligations to third parties. Id. 1 57-58. The tortious acts committed by Microsoft
against Netscape were "with deliberate and actual malice... and ... willful and wanton disre-
gard [for] Netscape's legal rights." Id. 66. Netscape requested relief as follows: "injunctive
relief sufficient to prevent further antitrust injury to Netscape and to restore competition lost in
the market for Web browsers, and to enable middleware platforms to compete with Intel-com-
patible PC operating systems," and actual damages, treble damages, interest on treble damages,
attorney fees, and any other costs of Netscape associated with this suit. "under Sections 4 and 16
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26." Id. at 18.
45 Be has recently filed such a suit. Complaint, Be, Inc. v. Microsoft, Corp. (N.D. Cal. filed
Feb. 18, 2002) (No. 02837MEJ).
46 Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 Gao. L.J. 2079, 2097
(1999).
47 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic
Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 1, 10 n.58 (1998).
48 See Transcript of Testimony of Cameron Myhrvold (Feb. 8, 1999), Microsoft, E-mail
from Christian Widreuer, Memphis IEU focus groups report (Feb. 24, 1997), Gov't Ex. 202,
Microsoft ("It seems clear that it will be very hard to increase browser market share on the
merits of IE 4 alone. It will be more important to leverage the OS asset to make people choose
IE instead of Navigator.").
49 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 103 (D.D.C. 1999)
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establish relevant benchmarks based upon what had happened to other mo-
nopoly software prices and market share levels when there was legitimate
competitive entry50 Alternatively, statistical analysis may offer some quanti-
fication of Netscape's loss due to particular Microsoft actions, but this analy-
sis would again need to separate the procompetitive aspects of new Microsoft
products from the actions at issue in this case.
It is also possible that Netscape would have remained a monopolist ab-
sent Microsoft's illegal conduct.51 Microsoft's actions may have caused one
monopolist (Netscape) to be replaced with another (Microsoft).52 Since Net-
scape presumably earned its monopoly honestly, however, it should be al-
lowed to keep these profits.53 Still, predicting Netscape's future normal or
monopoly profits would be difficult.
There might, however, be one item that Netscape might be able to prove
relatively easily. The district court found that Microsoft used its monopoly
power in the OS market to illegally foreclose the most cost-effective browser
distribution channels.5 4 Netscape presumably incurred higher distribution
costs for its browser due to this conduct. Such a comparison of the cost of
alternative distribution channels may not be simple in the final analysis, but it
appears to be conceptually possible.
There is another part of the losses involving the browser market that
would be more difficult to quantify. The district court found that many con-
sumers would have preferred to use Navigator but were "forced" to use IE.55
Calculation of consumers' damages from their lack of an ability to exercise
free choice would require a number of steps. A technologically sophisticated
consumer who desired Navigator probably simply downloaded and installed
it. The consumer's harm should presumably be less than the cost of doing
this. The damage calculation would have to estimate how much this is worth
on the average. It would also have to estimate what percentage of consumers
50 One route a browser plaintiff might consider would be a predatory pricing claim. Such
a claim was never alleged by the government in Microsoft, but the D.C. Circuit discussed it in
various contexts. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58, 68, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (en bane). This would mean Netscape might have to establish what the variable cost of
an OS and browser were, perhaps based on the costs over a browser's product life-cycle. While
most jurisdictions use a tough average variable cost benchmark for predatory pricing claims,
others appear to use a more lenient average total cost benchmark. In California, pricing below
average total cost with anticompetitive intent may be illegal. W'lliam Inglis & Sons Baking Co.
v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1038 (9th Cir. 1981); James R. McCall, Private
Enforcement of Predatory Price Laws Under the California Unlawful Practices Act and the Fed-
eral Antitrust Acts, 28 PAc. LJ. 311 (1997). Private plaintiffs would have an easier time in juris-
dictions like California than in many others.
51 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions
of Law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part per curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
52 Id.
53 Netscape might have earned monopoly level advertising rates, or monopoly rates for
first and second screen placements charges.
54 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
55 "Microsoft forced those consumers who otherwise would have elected Navigator as
their browser to either pay a substantial price (in the form of downloading, installation, confu-
sion, degraded system performance, and diminished memory capacity) or content themselves
with Internet Explorer." Id. at 111.
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simply gave up and used IE.56 Moreover, IE is an extremely good product,
so it could be difficult for aggrieved plaintiffs to prove significant damages
from their lack of choice. Thus, plaintiffs would have to develop new evi-
dence on these issues. Surveys may be able to get at some of these issues,
and there may be additional evidence from company files that has not been
revealed. It may also be possible to statistically study data on sales before
and after Microsoft's anticompetitive actions. However, this analysis would
indeed be challenging.
Even if these types of data were available, estimating consumer damages
would not be easy. Netscape chief executive officer James Barksdale testified
that overall browser innovation had been delayed by one to two years as a
result of Microsoft's predatory conduct.57 Assuming that a court believes
him, how could it calculate the damages from this loss of consumer welfare?
That is, what is the loss to society from the loss of the next Netscape Naviga-
tor, or the Navigator 9.0 or 10.0 that will never come into being, or will come
into being two years later? Also, suppose that competition from Netscape
10.0 would have spurred Microsoft to make an even better IE in 2003 or
2006? What benchmarks could be used to determine the world "but for" any
anticompetitive acts?
111. Private Damages Resulting from the Specific Conduct that
Constituted the Illegal Maintenance of
Microsoft's OS Monopoly
The third category of damages is composed of specific items of illegal
Microsoft conduct that might give rise to damages. Most of the factual re-
cord concerning these actions is not well developed. The government gener-
ally just proved that the harms occurred, but it did not attempt to quantify
the relevant damages. For each item, a significant amount of additional evi-
dence would presumably have to be gathered by plaintiffs. For example:
1. Microsoft did not permit OEMs to install shell "tutorial" programs.5 8
There was testimony from IBM and Hewlett-Packard that when Microsoft
forced them to remove their tutorials from their boot-up sequence, it made
their PCs "harder to use," caused customer confusion and led to increased
service calls.59 Could an OEM use this as the basis of a claim for lost profits?
Could an OEM reliably prove how many PCs they would have sold if they
had been able to install a "Windows for Dummies" shell tutorial? The record
is not well developed as to how many additional units IBM or Hewlett-Pack-
ard or other OEMs would have sold. They might well be able to introduce
56 We know of no specific findings on this issue. See id. at 45-46.
57 Transcript of Testimony of James Barksdale (Oct. 21, 1998), Microsoft.
58 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d. at 60-62.
59 Transcript of Testimony of Garry Norris (June 7, 1999), Microsoft, see also Trial Trans-
cipt (deposition excerpt of John Romano) (Dec. 16, 1998), Microsoft, Memorandum from John
Romano, Hewlett-Packard, to Dave Wright, Microsoft (undated), Gov't Ex. 309, Microsoft
("Microsoft's mandatory removal of all OEM boot-sequence and auto-start program for OEM




reliable evidence since their shell tutorials had been developed, at least docu-
menting their costs of developing programs they could not use. The harms to
consumers from never being able to purchase "Windows for Dummies" and
other tutorial products, moreover, could be large. However, these damages
may be impossible to quantify.
2. Microsoft's version of Java was illegally "intended to deceive Java de-
velopers, and [Microsoft] predicted that the effect of its actions would be to
generate Windows-dependent Java applications that their developers be-
lieved would be cross-platform." 60 Could Java developers who made prod-
ucts or in other ways lost money due to Microsoft's apparent deception be
able to prove damages? Perhaps, but many might not sue for fear of retalia-
tion from Microsoft.
3. Some corporate PC purchasers wanted a browserless Windows so that
employees would not surf the Internet, thus wasting the employees' time and
risking the import of viruses.61 The government provided evidence that this
occurred,62 but offered nothing as to its frequency. Could any private plain-
tiffs calculate the resulting damages? Business users could perhaps examine
employee time logs and PC records for the relevant period and attempt to
figure out how much time their employees were wasting surfing the Internet.
They might also be able to document the cost of lost time from viruses. Will
plaintiff lawyers or expert economists be able to do this with any degree of
accuracy? Again, surveys and creative economic or statistical analysis might
be able to arrive at some estimates, but it is unclear whether these analyses
would be reliable.
4. An OEM paid a lower amount for a Windows license if it agreed to
install IE exclusively.63 The firms who paid more might be able to recover
these overcharges in a damages action. Some of these claims could be rela-
tively easy to document. However, if the exclusivity provisions mirror legiti-
mate volume discounts, disagreggating the effects of exclusivity from normal
pricing could be complex. Also, these OEMs might be reluctant to sue
Microsoft in the interest of future business relationships. Moreover, if
Microsoft's primary method of inducing OEMs to install IE and only IE was
not through differential charges, but rather through some form of harass-
ment, then proving quantifiable damages could be even more difficult.
5. The D.C. Circuit also found that Microsoft acted illegally "with re-
spect to Java by using its monopoly power to prevent firms such as Intel from
aiding in the creation of cross-platform interfaces.... [Intel] had been in the
process of developing a high performance Windows-compatible JVM [java
virtual machine]. Microsoft wanted Intel to abandon that effort." 64 Could
Intel have profited from supporting cross-platform Java? Would this support
60 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en
banc).
61 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
62 Id
63 Id. at 27.
64 Id. at 56-58. See also the testimony of Steven D. McGeady of Intel that, had it not been
for Microsoft's illegal behavior, Intel's new technology "would have allowed a lot more innova-
tion in both software and hardware that would have... brought new media capabilities to the
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have aided the sale of other Intel products? Intel presumably would be enti-
tled to attempt to prove that it lost profits due to such actions using some of
the methods discussed above, but it would not be easy. The harm to consum-
ers from these forgone products would, as usual, be even more difficult to
quantify.65
6. The D.C. Circuit gave the government the opportunity to try the tying
issue on remand under a rule of reason analysis66 and the Department of
Justice has decided not to pursue this claim.67 Private plaintiffs, however, can
still pursue this theory of the case. Essentially, the government's theory was
that Microsoft implemented an anticompetitive tie between its OS and the IE
web browser. 68 Such a tie would enable Microsoft to take sales away from
Netscape and obtain a percentage of Internet commerce through, for exam-
ple, the biased placement of links on first or second screens.69 Assume that
Netscape, advertisers, or consumers succeed in proving that this tie is an-
ticompetitive. How much would the potential "kickbacks" from travel
agents, insurance companies, banks, phone companies, and others for pre-
ferred first or second screen placement be worth, and how much Microsoft
revenue is due to the tie rather than legitimate services from IE? A court
could first examine the amounts of money that Microsoft is already getting
for this type of preferential placement from its affiliates. As before, disaggre-
gating damage estimates would be difficult. However, the amounts involved
could be quite large.
IV. Conclusions and Policy Considerations
It is useful to step back and consider the overall impact of the actions of
Microsoft that the Court found illegal. Consider Judge Jackson's Finding of
Fact 214, which the D.C. Circuit adopted 7 :
The several OEMs that in the aggregate represented over ninety
percent of Intel-compatible PC sales believed that the new restric-
tions would make their PC systems more difficult and more confus-
ing to use, and thus less acceptable to consumers. They also
anticipated that the restrictions would increase product returns and
support costs and generally lower the value of their machines.
Those OEMs that had already spent millions of dollars developing
and implementing tutorial and registration programs and/or auto-
PC more quickly over time." Transcript of Testimony of Steven D. McGeady, Intel (Nov. 9,
1998), Microsoft.
65 Finding of Fact 410 describes how Microsoft's conduct towards Intel "deprived consum-
ers of software innovation that they very well may have found valuable, had the innovation been
allowed to reach the marketplace." Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (Findings of Fact 410).
66 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en
banc).
67 Supra note 16.
68 Id.
69 The alleged behavior appears to be a classic tie to price discriminate. See, e.g., LYNNE
PEPALL, ET AL., INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND PRAcTICE 119-142
(1999).
70 The Court accepted Judge Jackson's findings of fact under the normal "clearly errone-
ous" standard. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 118.
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matically-loading graphical interfaces in the Windows boot se-
quence lamented that their investment would, as a result of
Microsoft's policy, be largely wasted 1
Is it impossible to think that plaintiffs could recover a portion of such
damages? If Lopatka and Page's arguments are taken to their logical conclu-
sions, there would not only be difficulties in proving damages in the
Microsoft case, but there will be very few instances where an antitrust plain-
tiff would be able to collect any damages.2
At this time we cannot predict whether any private plaintiffs will be able
to overcome the formidable proof problems associated with potential private
damages actions arising from this case.73 Most private antitrust cases are
largely about money, and that is likely to be true for private cases brought
against Microsoft.74 Even in straightforward price fixing cases there is always
an issue of disaggregation between price increases due to collusion and price
increases due to cost increases and other exogenous shocks. Any monopoli-
zation, exclusion, tying, or exclusive dealing case will always have a mixture
of motives that could lead to precisely the kinds of complications that Profes-
sors Page and Lopatka identify75 Moreover, the damages in many cartel
cases consist not only of the overcharges caused by the collusion, but also the
cartel's other anticompetitive effects on efficiency, innovation, quality, and
variety. To an even larger degree, the main harm to consumer welfare from
Microsoft's behavior may not be higher prices, but reduced innovation and
diminished consumer choice.76 While many of these nonprice harms are dif-
ficult or impossible to quantify, at least the quantifiable claims can help com-
pensate victims and deter future anticompetitive behavior.77 The amount of
71 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
72 Lopatka and Page's symposium article in many ways reads like a defense lawyer's brief.
If we accept their arguments it seems difficult to imagine that a plaintiff would ever be able to
win damages in any antitrust case other than a straightforward price fixing case.
73 One of the best private antitrust cases against Microsoft was brought by Caldera, and it
settled. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1323 (D. Utah 1999), cert. denied,
70 U.S.L.W. 3107 (U.S. Aug 7, 2001).
74 But see Complaint, Netscape Comm. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22,
2002) (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233).
75 If the harm had to be proven with certainty, it is doubtful that plaintiffs in any of these
kinds of cases would be able to collect. "Certainty" is not, however, the legal standard. Roger
D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH. L. REv. 423, 425-27
(1995) and cases cited therein. The question is whether plaintiffs will be able to convince a trier
of fact that they have proven that any of the damages that we discuss in this article are likely, or
reasonably probable, as opposed to speculative.
76 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp 2d at 112 (Findings of Fact 412).
Most harmful of all is the message that Microsoft's actions have conveyed to every
enterprise with the potential to innovate in the computer industry .... [Microsoft
has repeatedly] demonstrated that it will use its prodigious market power and im-
mense profits to harm any firm that insists on pursuing initiatives that could inten-
sify competition against one of Microsoft's core products.... The ultimate result is
that some innovations that would truly benefit consumers never occur for the sole
reason that they do not coincide with Microsoft's self-interest.
Id.
77 See generally Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Dam-
ages?, 54 Owo ST. LJ. 115, 122-29 (1993).
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deterrence or compensation that would result from private cases will of
course depend upon the magnitude of quantifiable damages that can be
proven.
In crime novels it is usually the clever private detective who protects
society and forces the bad guys to lose their ill-gotten gains. The proof of
private damages in the Microsoft case appears more challenging than in most
antitrust cases, similar to evidence in the more complex detective novels. It is
doubtful that anyone will break down and confess to any wrongdoing in
Microsoft, as often happens in these detective novels, so judges or juries will
have the last word in weighing the evidence. Under these circumstances, so-
ciety may have to rely to a large extent on the antitrust police, rather than the
antitrust equivalent of Sam Spade. Nevertheless, Sam may still have some-
thing to contribute.
